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For all intents and purposes: Depositor behaviour and strategy in 
a London savings bank 
 
In this paper, we offer an alternative to class-based studies of saving behaviour by using 
individual-level ledger records from accounts opened in 1830 in the Limehouse Savings 
Bank, London. Our analysis suggests that such banks banks served a valid financial 
purpose for a much wider constituency of savers than the targeted ‘industrious poor’. 
True gaming of the system by the middle classes appears to be relatively limited, and 
instead depositors were using accounts for a variety of means and motivations. We 
suggest that the contemporary consternation around class was misplaced, and that we 
can better understand and predict depositor behaviours through analysis of transaction 
data.  
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I. Introduction 
The birth of British savings banks sparked a contemporaneous debate about the extent to which 
access to banking could ameliorate the social problems faced by the poor. For the 
philanthropist, savings banks could aid the working classes by promoting a thrifty 
consciousness of the future, and thus improve the social security of workers. However, for their 
critics, savings banks were of limited social efficacy and were instead ripe for exploitation by 
the middle classes. In England and Wales, the founders of savings banks created them on a 
‘savings only’ model with the ostensible aim of pursuing social welfare outcomes. Savings 
banks paid interest to savers by using the deposits to purchase government bonds that paid 
guaranteed interest. In other countries, e.g. Sweden, savings banks generated the funds to pay 
interest on deposits from the interest they charged on loans. The result of the deposit-only 
 
 
model has been to position English and Welsh savings banks within the history of humanitarian 
institutions, and not productive financialisation.i As a consequence, the bulk of the literature 
concerning savings banks does not reside in the fields of economic and financial history but in 
philanthropy and historical social policy.  
The lack of attention by financial historians shown towards the savings behaviour of 
individuals in 19th century Britain has weakened the social histories of working class financial 
management,ii and past studies of its banks.iii The use of ledger data in the study of savings in 
the United States is more establishediv and, more recently, there have been studies using 
transaction data in respect of both Scottish (i.e. Glasgow) and Irish (i.e. Thurles) savings 
banks.v The lack of ledger based research is regrettable. Without a body of historical research 
that uses transaction data, modern debates about savings – including those that discuss savings 
within a lifecycle or transitional income framework – lack a long-term perspective and fail to 
put savings behaviour sufficiently in the frame.vi  
This paper puts the savers, and their behaviours, at the centre of the analysis. It uses a recently 
constructed database of 3,625 individual account transactions from the Limehouse Savings 
Bank in London, which has a long unbroken run of ledger records available. We were able to 
capture data across the lifespan of all accounts opened in 1830, some of which are held in 
excess of 40 years. Our 195 new account openers in 1830 comprised 57 adult men, 74 adult 
women – 33 married, 32 single, and 9 widowed, and 37 children’s accounts – 19 girls and 18 
boys. Seventeen accounts were held jointly, and ten in trust for other individuals – most often 
children. The accounts opened in 1830 contained 16 family groups; four consisted of related 
adults, the remaining twelve were either child siblings, or a parent plus child(ren). The 
assembled database allows us to explore research questions and test propositions that studies, 
which rely on official 19th century government statistics based on reporting from each bank 
 
 
regarding account numbers and total deposits, do not. We are able to link depositor 
characteristics such as gender, age and marital status with transaction information, and thus 
identify the potential social determinants of depositor behaviour. Furthermore, by focusing on 
previously overlooked factors such as opening deposit, proximity, and family group accounts, 
we can provide insight into the likely strategic intentions of savers. The choice of 1830, despite 
the lack of census data for the same period, was in order to take advantage of the 1828 
standardisation of record-keeping in English and Welsh savings banks and to have a benchmark 
year that was still in the period where the banks, and accessible banking, were established.   
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we establish the historical reporting 
formats of the savings banks and the reasons why ‘class of depositor’ tables became an extra-
official category of reporting. The restrictive, and limiting, legacy of that reporting format on 
subsequent scholarship in relation to savings behaviour is briefly discussed. In the following 
section, the Limehouse data and collection procedure are outlined, and three hypotheses are 
proposed. We then examine the social determinants of depositor behaviour, focusing on 
gender, age and marital status. Following this, we address our three novel hypotheses – 
focusing on the relevance of opening deposit, location and linked accounts in transaction 
patterns. Finally, the paper concludes by considering the new insight gained from shifting the 
focus of the analysis from class-of-depositor to individual transaction patterns. Such an 
approach, we argue, is much more illuminating on the range of valid social and economic 
functions such banks fulfilled, and crucially provides a more useful benchmark for further 
comparison with savings institutions in other times and places.  
II. Reporting of occupational class 
Savings banks, as initially conceived of in England and Wales, were a type of financial 
institution that was formed outside the private and limited joint-stock banking system of the 
 
 
period. Savings banks in England and Wales only offered deposit facilities, set limits on the 
amount that could be deposited annually, and would not extend credit. After 1817, all monies 
collected by savings banks were deposited with the government in bonds, known as Consols, 
and used to offset national debt.vii Consol rates were generous and a near constant source of 
complaint from critics. The suspicion was that affluent middle-class savers were exploiting 
banks that were created for the working poor. Parliament saw a number of further attempts by 
concerned representatives to lower deposit limits and interest rates to reduce the potential for 
exploitation after the more obvious loopholes were closed in 1828, but they remained largely 
as set at the end of the 1820s throughout the century. Newspapers were also keen to point out 
the colonisation of the savings banks by the middle class – pointing to the practice of opening 
accounts for each child in the family and depositing the maximum annual amount or knowingly 
flouting the law that an individual could not hold more than one account by opening accounts 
in a number of separate banks.viii 
Maltby’s paper on the reporting requirements of savings banks in England and Wales outlines 
the path dependency created by the perceived requirement of savings banks to defend 
themselves against the charge that they were institutions for the benefit of the monied middle 
class.ix She identifies two different categories of reporting. The first set was created by the 
savings bank legislation itself. All banks had the same year end of November 20th, which was 
also the date individual account interest was calculated and recorded. Each bank was required 
to produce an annual report and return, and to have this report approved at an annual meeting 
of trustees and managers prior to its return to the National Debt Commissioner. The report was 
to include a statement of the total amounts received and withdrawn from savers in the year, the 
amount paid to the National Debt Commissioners for investment, and the total of balances held 
by the bank. The bank was also required to produce a breakdown of the number of depositor 
accounts in bands from those below £20 to those above £200.x  
 
 
The second type of reporting was that which the individual banks felt necessary to produce for 
local stakeholders, including the press, and which sought to present evidence as to the class of 
depositor the bank had. Unlike the state-mandated reporting categories, the class of depositor 
reporting by banks differed and was not directly comparable. Maltby provides four examples 
from banks across the UK and Ireland that showed the different descriptions used of savers in 
terms of their occupations and social class.xi The differences are probably representative of the 
different social mix applicable to the different countries, their local economies and social 
structure. However, Maltby suggests that the banks in her sample opted not to use the categories 
included by the parliamentary Select Committee for depositors at the ‘higher end’ of social 
standing. Her inference is that the banks did so to shield themselves from criticism that they 
were not fulfilling their social mission of attracting the poor.xii  
Our concern with occupational data is twofold. The occupational data we have for Limehouse 
accounts opened in 1830 shows that even if an occupation is held in common, motivations to 
save are not, and neither is the amount of income available to save. Engineers, mariners, 
shipwrights, and watermen are occupations that appear across all savings categories, and all 
deposit sizes. And so do married women. That observation leads to our second concern i.e. that 
it focuses attention – to a greater extent than is justified – on adult male savers. Adult males do 
not represent the majority of savers in our Limehouse sample and to categorise savers 
according to occupations in preference to demographic and behavioural characteristics is 
androcentric. As Folbre notes,xiii the gender bias inherent in definitions of economically 
productive activity has implications for the analysis of change in labour force participation and, 
we would argue, financial management.  
Nonetheless, as  a result of the social concerns about who was using the savings banks, it is 
class of depositor information, together with the annual reporting of the banks with regards to 
 
 
total deposits and standardised bands of account balance, that forms the bulk of the accessible 
British data available to savings historians. The problem with this data is that it restricts the 
researcher to a very narrow set of research questions. Existing research, especially in respect 
of English and Welsh, savings banks therefore tends to focus on who the savers were 
(according to broad occupational rather than social demographic categories), and the analysis 
of regional or nationally aggregated account balances.  
In terms of surviving historical data, it has also (erroneously) been assumed that there is little 
extant material regarding working-class savings in English and Welsh banks available,xiv 
especially as the account ledgers of the Post Office Savings Banks have not been conserved. A 
survey of the Trustee Savings Bank material held in the Lloyds TSB Archive in 2015 suggests 
we are in a more fortunate position than previously thought. The TSB archive holds bank 
ledgers representing 55 banks, 17 of which have continuous runs of data for 45 years or more. 
There are individual bank account details from 25 individual banks that show transactions from 
1818, and 19 of those 25 banks have records that cover the entire 1818–1828 period that was 
assumed to be missing altogether.xv Added to the official TSB holdings are those additional 
historical bank records held in county, city and district archives – all of which represent a rich 
resource for examining 19th century savings behaviour.    
Ledger data has been used in savings bank research in the US and, more recently, has also been 
sampled in relation to a Scottish savings bank to establish the response of savers to financial 
crises in 1847 and 1857. xvi Payne also used transaction data for Glasgow, but in a limited 
way.xvii Although time-consuming and labour-intensive, the benefits of looking at transaction-
level data is obvious. For example, Perriton and Maltby’s study of transaction patterns at four 
English savings banks was able to challenge long-standing assumptions about the conflictual 
nature of working-class financial management within marriage by looking at the number of 
 
 
married women accounts and the broad use patterns revealed by deposit-to-withdrawal 
ratios.xviii Studies using transaction data – even at a meta-level to allocate accounts to categories 
– create a richer picture of historical savings behaviour.  
We wanted to fully exploit the ledger data we have available by creating a database for all 
accounts opened in the calendar year 1830 in the savings bank in Limehouse, London in order 
to look beyond occupational class analysis. The Limehouse Savings Bank (created as the 
Limehouse Provident Institution for Savings in 1816) was typical of the type of savings bank 
that survived into the 20th century because it served a diverse, urban population. The district 
of Limehouse is approximately two miles east of the medieval London Docks next to the Tower 
of London and formed the industrial and manufacturing hinterland to the east of the city. The 
East End of London, as the area is known generically, is situated at the junction of the road 
transport routes into the site of the ‘new’ docks on the Isle of Dogs peninsula in the Thames 
and the older road routes out of the city towards the Essex coast. As a result of the growing 
transport infrastructure around the docks in the 19th century, the rapidly increasing population 
of Limehouse and its surrounding parishes specialised in trade and small manufacturing.xix 
III. Limehouse – data and hypotheses 
To explore the transaction patterns of individual savers, we accessed the individual account 
records of the Limehouse Savings Bank, extant in the year range 1828–1876, to examine the 
savings behaviour of a cohort of savers who opened accounts in 1830. The sample year of 1830 
was chosen as it represented a point at which savings bank record-keeping and reporting was 
standardised, and where the accounts opened would be operating under the reforms of 1828 
i.e. maximum annual deposits and maximum account limits. John Tidd Pratt, the barrister 
advising the Commission for the Reduction of Public Debt, and Registrar of Friendly Societies, 
also published his ‘History of the Savings Banks in England, Wales and Ireland’ in 1830.xx 
 
 
This report contains a useful summary of the savings banks in existence at that date, including 
their total reported depositors and average account balances. Similar summaries and returns 
would be published in subsequent years by parliament. However, 1830 also marked the end of 
an unstable period of Conservative government that had introduced the savings bank legislation 
and the start of parliamentary reforms. This included a debate as to whether savings bank 
balances could be used as the basis of suffrage. Clearly, by 1830, savings banks were an 
established part of the social landscape and had won acceptance, albeit often partial and 
grudging, across the political divide.  
The 1830 sample comprises 195 new saver accounts, and a total of 3,625 individual 
transactions. Each account was given a unique identifier number and the following were 
recorded: name(s) of account holder(s), residential address at account opening, occupation or 
status of the account holder(s), a note of whether the account was held individually, jointly, or 
in trust, and any margin notes or interesting features of the account. Joint accounts are accounts 
that have two or more named account holders. Trust accounts are accounts opened by an 
individual ‘in trust’ for a third party. Trust accounts have a named trustee, who is listed first 
and then the words ‘in trust for’ appear before the second name. Every individual account 
transaction (deposit, withdrawal, interest payment) was recorded over the life of each account 
together with the date the transaction occurred. Where accounts were closed and re-opened at 
a later date, we have noted the years of closure but treat the account duration as being from the 
first deposit to the last withdrawal.xxi  
For the analysis, we amalgamated the depositor and transaction data to generate a spreadsheet 
of aggregate statistics by depositor. By identifying savers’ residential addresses on a map of 
Limehouse in 1851,xxii we were also able to consider the relevance of proximity to the bank in 
depositor behaviour. In addition, we supplemented the ledger data with English census data 
 
 
(1841–1891) and data from the index of births, deaths and marriages. This enabled us to 
establish approximate birth years of a small sub-sample of savers, which we use as illustrative 
cases. 
Hypotheses  
Using the Limehouse data, we aim to address three hypotheses which will provide a different 
perspective on the functionality of British savings banks and move the debate beyond the 
existing class-of-depositor perspective. These three hypotheses are now outlined.  
Hypothesis 1: Opening deposit predicts subsequent depositor behaviour 
Opening deposit data has been used infrequently in savings bank research, and even less often 
in relation to the analysis of subsequent saver behaviour. Alter, Goldin and Rotella’s paper on 
the Philadelphia Savings Fund includes opening deposits as a category of analysis in examining 
the duration of accounts.xxiii However, as the median opening deposit is consistent across 
sample, it is not a significant factor in their analysis. Pollock also notes the median and lower 
and upper quartile of opening deposits in his study of the Glasgow Savings Bank.xxiv However, 
like the inclusion of the figure in the Philadelphia study, the opening deposit is merely noted 
in Pollock’s study rather than used in analysis. Given the emphasis on who saved in many 
studies, it is often the maximum balance held that is deemed to be of greater significance.  
Yet the size of the opening deposit often vexed the critics of English and Welsh savings banks. 
Savers were restricted to a total of £30 in deposits per annum. Those who deposited the whole 
£30 upon opening an account in their own name – or via a trust, or across a number of family 
members’ accounts – were suspected of taking advantage of savings bank provision.xxv 
Transaction data allows us to categorise accounts using the opening deposit, and to look closely 
at those accounts that caused consternation at the time i.e. those opened with £30. Unlike the 
Philadelphia study, which reported a consistent opening deposit of circa $50, Limehouse has a 
 
 
much wider spread of opening deposits from small to the maximum and has greater salience in 
this study as an analytical category.  
Hypothesis 2: Depositor location affects behaviour 
At the time of the introduction of the Post Office Savings Bank in 1861, it was noted that much 
of the population did not have a local savings bank – 15 counties had no provision at all, and 
many populous towns also lacked one.xxvi The reliance on volunteer trustees to oversee the 
operation of the bank, and to be present during opening hours, limited the times that they were 
open. Limited opening times were therefore identified as a barrier to creating a regular savings 
habit – unless you lived in close proximity to a bank. The importance of proximity in 
encouraging savings behaviour has been a feature of recommendations in relation to increasing 
savings in the general population from the late 19th century to present day. Microfinance 
institutions, especially those that cater to the rural poor in developing countries focus on 
proximity as one of their main priorities. Although there is no single measure that captures the 
determinants of saving in an institution, meta-analyses have established that locational 
convenience (i.e. distance covered to deposit and withdraw), low transaction costs, simplicity 
of transactions, ability to deposit small amounts, and convenience of service hours, are all 
positive indicators.xxvii We anticipate being able to discern differential patterns of savings 
behaviour based on residential location and distance from the Limehouse Savings Bank.  
Hypothesis 3: Gaming of savings bank account holding existed, but was minimal 
The potential for misuse of the savings banks, as noted above, was a concern of fiscal 
conservatives in government throughout the first half of the 19th century. Misuse in this context 
covered two main areas i.e. multiple account holding, and profit-seeking from middle-class 
depositors who were taking advantage of subsidised interest payments intended for the poor. 
Fishlow contends that the regulatory changes of 1828, which created a balance ceiling of £200, 
 
 
together with an annual maximum deposit limit of £30, and the disallowed practice of multiple 
account holding effectively saw the end of systematic exploitation of the savings banks by the 
wealthy.xxviii He points to the substantial reduction in accounts and deposits after the 
introduction of the 1828 regulations. There was still potential for masking multiple account. 
Individuals could do so by opening accounts in children’s names but operating them as their 
own, banking in a neighbouring or distant bank in addition to holding an account their local 
bank and not disclosing it, and/ or by using trust accounts opened in the name of individuals 
unaware of the account or the transactions undertaken in their name.  
Fishlow made the point that given the English joint-stock banks did not provide opportunities 
for those with modest cash surpluses it was reasonable to conclude that English savings banks 
would attract a greater number of middle-class accounts than was the case elsewhere.xxix We 
accept Fishlow’s point. We do not see the existence of higher-balance accounts, or certain 
occupations amongst the depositors, as evidence of gaming of the savings bank system per se. 
We do, however, believe that transaction data will be able to identify ‘problematic’ accounts 
from the 19th century perspective. Perriton suggested that the ‘strategic’ use of Limehouse 
trust accounts after 1844, the date in which changes were made to the regulations concerning 
such accounts, was circa 5%.xxx Because trust accounts were an unreformed feature of the 
system in 1830, we anticipate a higher rate of accounts that are potentially gaming the post-
1828 rules by exploiting trusts, but that the incidence of such accounts will be minimal.  
IV. Summary statistics 
Before addressing our hypotheses, we first present some summary statistics relating to the 




Table 1 shows the basic composition of our sample. In the individual depositor categories, 
there is a majority of female depositors (55%) to male depositors (45%). Most of the individual 
accounts (67%) are held by adults, although there is a significant minority of children. The 
sizeable proportion of children is plausible – children were financially active either by their 
involvement in penny capitalismxxxi or when in receipt of monetary gifts. An emphasis on thrift 
amongst the middle classes also makes the number of child accounts opened unsurprising and 
may reflect a prevailing social norm in the instruction of children on the benefits of saving. 
Nevertheless, statistics presented later in the paper do question whether some child accounts 








Non-individual accounts opened in Limehouse in 1830 are either joint (9%) or trust accounts 
(5%). Joint accounts are accounts that have two or more named account holders. In many cases 
the named individuals share a family name, but there are examples where this is not the case 
and/or cases where there is an additional margin note that ‘any two to sign’. Trust accounts are 
accounts opened by an individual ‘in trust’ for a third party. In the majority of cases, where a 
trust account is recorded the named trustee does not share the family name of the individual 
Table 1. Frequency of accounts 
 Frequency % of total 
Adult male 57 29.23 
Adult female 74 37.95 
   Widow 9 4.62 
   Married                      33 16.92 
   Single 32 16.41 
Child male 18 9.23 
Child female 19 9.74 
Joint 17 8.72 
Trust 10 5.13 
Total 195  
 
 
the account is held in trust for – just four out of the eleven trust accounts are held for another 
(child or infant) family member. For example, Ruth Noble holds accounts in trust for Eleanor 
Walford and Hannah Packer, and Mary Ann Whitehead is trustee for a servant, Mary Ring, for 
a scant six months before she takes full control of her own account and runs it independently 
for the next three years. There is also an example of an account held in trust for a widow by an 
individual male, who is not listed amongst the heirs to her estate (and passbook), and which 
we presume is a solicitor or some other legal representative.  
Transaction statistics 
Adults 
Table 2 shows the number and size of depositor transactions according to our main 
demographic categories.xxxii On average, adult males make larger deposits and larger 
withdrawals than adult females. Furthermore, among both adults and children, males tend to 
make more transactions than females, with adult males noticeably transaction-heavy relative 
to others.  
 
Table 2. Number and size of transactions 
 Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max Obs. 
Number of deposits       
All 7.56 3.00 14.90 1.00 130.00 195 
Adult male 7.95 4.00 10.77 1.00 47.00 57 
Adult female 6.30 2.50 9.72 1.00 66.00 74 
   Widow 4.44 2.00 5.32 1.00 16.00 9 
   Married 9.36 5.00 13.34 1.00 66.00 33 
   Single 3.66 1.50 3.65 1.00 15.00 32 
Child male 16.89 2.00 38.88 1.00 130.00 18 
Child female 4.89 2.00 5.02 1.00 15.00 19 
Joint 6.35 3.00 9.47 1.00 39.00 17 
Trust 5.10 3.50 4.53 1.00 14.00 10 
       
Average deposit       
All £10 15s 8d £7 6s 8d £10 3s 8d £0 1s 0d £30 8s 9d 195 
Adult male £12 5s 3d £8 1s 6d £9 19s 11d £0 3s 0d £30 8s 9d 57 
 
 
Adult female £9 4s 2d £6 10s 5d £9 6s 7d £0 1s 6d £30 0s 0d 74 
   Widow £13 0s 6d £11 6s 8d £11 9s 2d £1 0s 0d £30 0s 0d 9 
   Married £10 13s 7d £8 0s 0d £10 5s 5d £0 1s 6d £30 0s 0d 33 
   Single £6 12s 5d £3 13s 0d £6 19s 6d £0 2s 6d £30 0s 0d 32 
Child male £10 8s 2d £2 8s 5d £12 12s 0d £0 2s 0d £30 0s 0d 18 
Child female £10 8s 3d £2 15s 11d £12 15s 2d £0 1s 0d £30 0s 0d 19 
Joint £14 7s 9d £11 8s 11d £9 14s 1d £2 15s 0d £30 0s 0d 17 
Trust £9 5s 3d £7 17s 5d £7 6s 6d £1 12s 10d £22 11s 3d 10 
       
Number of withdrawals       
All 5.23 2.00 7.29 0.00 37.00 195 
Adult male 6.05 3.00 8.21 1.00 37.00 57 
Adult female 4.55 2.00 6.05 0.00 34.00 74 
   Widow 5.56 4.00 4.75 1.00 13.00 9 
   Married 6.36 4.00 7.68 1.00 34.00 33 
   Single 2.41 1.00 3.30 0.00 18.00 32 
Child male 5.94 2.00 9.20 1.00 34.00 18 
Child female 1.68 1.00 1.45 1.00 6.00 19 
Joint 8.59 5.00 9.15 1.00 31.00 17 
Trust 5.20 2.00 7.70 1.00 26.00 10 
       
Average withdrawal       
All £15 4s 2d £8 11s 2d £18 1s 7d £0 1s 0d £93 6s 1d 194 
Adult male £18 5s 4d £12 2s 4d £17 13s 4d £0 3s 0d £90 0s 3d 57 
Adult female £13 8s 9d £5 14s 2d £17 18s 10d £0 1s 6d £93 6s 1d 73 
   Widow £10 7s 1d £9 17s 10d £10 2s 5d £1 0s 9d £31 5s 3d 9 
   Married £14 15s 9d £4 6s 2d £18 4s 5d £0 1s 6d £62 1s 5d 33 
   Single £12 18s 0d £5 14s 2d £19 13s 0d £0 2s 6d £93 6s 1d 31 
Child male £8 11s 0d £4 12s 9d £8 13s 3d £0 8s 0d £30 10s 0d 18 
Child female £15 14s 8d £15 12s 6d £12 17s 6d £0 1s 0d £30 13s 4d 19 
Joint £15 17s 11d £7 2s 11d £23 11s 4d £0 19s 8d £84 8s 5d 17 
Trust £20 10s 4d £7 10s 6d £28 14s 11d £2 2s 8d £92 5s 4d 10 
 
There are also pronounced differences between adult women’s savings behaviour when we 
subdivide the adult females into widow, married and single categories.xxxiii The widows in our 
sample tend to make a large opening deposit, then undertake multiple withdrawals, either to 
zero or a very small sum at account closure. This pattern can easily be made to fit a typical 
scenario where the widow opens an account with the inheritance from their deceased spouse 
and that they then run that balance down in living expenses. However, that assumption is not 
borne out in the savers we have been able to trace through census and birth, death and marriage 
data. For example, Margaret Leslie, a widow of 2 New Crane Place, Shadwell, does open her 
 
 
account relatively soon after her husband’s death. But Margaret is a small saver in terms of 
opening deposit (£2), and although she accumulates steadily for the next three years, she then 
enters an active period of deposits and withdrawals until 1838, and then only draws down on 
the account until the account closes in 1845. Margaret dies in 1870, so we cannot assume the 
period of draw down is in anticipation of her death or last serious illness. Another widow in 
our sample, Sarah Hornzee,xxxiv opens her account with the maximum annual deposit of £30, 
but she opens her account at 56 years of age, and six years after the death of her husband. She 
makes one further deposit of £30 before commencing a period of drawing down from the 
account over the next four years. Again, this period does not correspond to her own decline as 
she dies in 1842 – eight years after the account is closed. 
Single women, on average, tend to hold their accounts for relatively short periods of time, have 
a low number of transactions overall, and deposit the least among adult women. However, 
relative to their opening balance they close their accounts at a relatively high level – their 
median closing balance (approx. £9) is over twice their median opening balance (approx. £4). 
Taken together, this suggests a pattern of lower amounts available for saving, less frequent 
deposits, and the situation where the money is kept until needed for transfer elsewhere (perhaps 
to follow domestic employment), or for a definite purpose – also a finding of the Philadelphia 
Savings Fund study.xxxv 
Married women tend to deposit significantly more money than single women, and also make 
more deposits and withdrawals. We agree with Perriton and Maltby in finding the number of 
accounts held by married women difficult to reconcile with a patriarchal, and controlling, 
model of working-class financial management. The number of joint married accounts, and 
intra-family accounts, is indicative of a more egalitarian model of joint decision making on 




The account activity of children is one of the most confusing in the data. There is a large 
difference between the median and mean for both the opening and average deposit. Ironically, 
it is the children who do learn the lesson of thrift that may be the root cause of some of these 
differences. For example, Richard Hinderwell, is a newborn child when an account is opened 
for him in 1830 with 15s. He becomes an active saver into adulthood – depositing a total of 
£14 17s over the next 43 years and (probably) beyond given that his account is still open at the 
end of the extant ledgers. His case reflects one of the two extremes of savers in this category, 
the other extreme being those children who are not aware of holding an account opened and 
operated by a parent.   
Some children show little evidence for having learned the lessons of thrift in childhood but 
nonetheless become savers as adults. One such individual, Margaret Vesper, has an account 
opened for her aged 10 with an opening deposit of 17s. A further deposit of 13s is added in the 
same year but after that point the account is untouched until 1842, a year prior to her marriage 
when she makes her first adult deposit of £1 8s. However, the year after her marriage her 
account appears to be used as a marital savings account. Over a period of 18 months, the 
account balance reaches £23 and is then steadily withdrawn from in the next 12 months until 
it is closed. 
Joint and trust accounts 
Joint accounts were not a feature of all savings banks, but trust accounts were. Banks that 
served a diverse urban community e.g. Limehouse and Newcastle, were more amenable to non-
standard account types than were the smaller, regional banks such as Bury.xxxvii The trustees of 
the urban banks seemed to take the view that if a type of account was not explicitly prohibited 
 
 
then they would allow it. As a result, we see joint accounts between two or more individuals 
representing different generations of the same family, work colleagues, and married couples.  
In relative terms, joint accounts and trust accounts are held for significantly longer periods of 
time than individual accounts (a mean of nine and eleven years respectively). Joint married 
accounts are active accounts, suggestive of a cycle of building up of pooled financial resources 
and then deploying cover for unexpected expenditure. Joint accounts have the highest mean 
deposit at £14 7s 9d (approximately £4 above the average for all accounts), and the most 
withdrawals. This is highly suggestive of the use of joint accounts to smooth the demands on 
domestic expenditure.  
Typical of the trend for joint accounts to be held over a longer period of time is the account of 
Christopher and Margaret Morris, of 18 Farmer Street, Shadwell. Christopher, a shipwright, 
and Margaret Morris open a joint married account in 1830 with £10. The age of Christopher is 
unknown, but Margaret is 27 at the time. This is a long-term account for the couple lasting 30 
years and the account activity falls broadly into two patterns. In the first 15 years of the account 
it is – for the most part – an accumulating account although there are occasional withdrawals 
alongside the deposits. After 1847, the account functions as a draw down account, with a steady 
depletion of the account – significant in the first seven years in terms of totals but then slowing 
in the last seven. The only deposit that is made in the period 1846–1860 is £7 deposited in the 
year of Christopher’s death in 1857 – suggestive of a small inheritance from him being 
deposited in the account. The account is closed nine years prior to Margaret’s own death. 
In this period – and until the regulations were tightened in 1844 – trust accounts are more 
suspect in terms of potential for evading the prohibition regarding multiple account holding. 
However, in the summary statistics, apart from a higher deposit-to-withdrawal ratio and the 
 
 
relatively long account duration, there are no striking differences between trust accounts and 
the “average” account.  
V. Opening deposit and subsequent behaviour 
Savings banks in England and Wales in this period accepted deposits as low as 1s to a 
maximum of £30. The £30 figure was the maximum that could be deposited annually, but there 
was no bar to using that allowance in a single or first deposit. The result, in our Limehouse 
sample, is of a relatively wide spread of opening deposit amounts (see Figure 1 below). The 
data contains noticeable clusters at both ends of the deposit amount continuum.xxxviii  
       
Notes: We have not included the one exception of an account opened with £60.  
For the purpose of further comparison, we will divide our savers into three groups according 
to their account balance, which we have displayed as follows: £2 or less (small savers), between 
£2 and £30 (intermediate depositors), and £30 (max depositors).. At the upper end, 
approximately 22 per cent of our cohort opened their accounts at the maximum balance of 
£30.xxxix This provides a natural sub-group, since those depositing the maximum balance are 
considered more suspect in terms of their use of the bank. At the lower end, we choose £2 as 


















Opening balance in £s
Figure 1. Frequency of opening balances
 
 
of savers deposit between £2 and £30, leaving approximately 29 per cent classified as small 
savers.xl 
Our hypothesis is that opening deposit is an indicator of subsequent depositor behaviour. Our 
further assumption is that those who open an account with a small amount of money are 
primarily seeking an opportunity to save. However, the capacity to accumulate further savings, 
at least for the next 12 months, is denied for those who open their accounts with the £30 
maximum. If these accounts were genuine savings accounts – as opposed to a holding or storing 
account – then we would expect to see them held over a longer period of time, and to be held 
until the maximum interest-bearing balance is reached. A shorter time period or a pattern of 
harvesting the interest payments on the balance would suggest that the objective of the £30 was 
to have ready access to liquid assets, a bonus in terms of interest generation (albeit of relatively 
small amounts relative to the capital committed to produce it), and secure storage.   
Table 3 shows the transaction differences between the account holders according to the three 
opening deposit categories: £2 or less (small savers), between £2 and £30 (intermediate 
depositors), and £30 (max depositors).  
Table 3. Depositor behaviour by opening deposit category 
 £2 or less Betw. £2 and £30 £30 (or more) 
Percentage of savers 28.72% 49.74% 21.54% 
Average deposit*  £1 5s 11d £9 19s 4d £25 6s 4d 
Average withdrawal  £4 2s 6d £17 5s 3d £24 19s 8s 
Total deposited £18 7s 1d £51 9s 0d £61 16s 4d 
Number of deposits 11.66 7.02 3.36 
Number of withdrawals 4.80 5.75 4.57 
Ratio of deposits to withdrawals 3.10 1.95 1.07 
Account duration 4.47 years 6.18 years 4.51 years 
Accumulating 30.91% 19.59% 4.76% 
Contingency 43.64% 49.48% 40.48% 
Draw down 0.00% 16.49% 19.05% 
In and out 25.45% 14.43% 35.71% 
Note: The percentage of savers relates to the 195 savers. Non-percentage figures are means. (*Average deposit is the total 
deposited / number of deposits. This is calculated for each saver. The figure in the table is the mean of all these individual 
saver statistics.) For some of the statistics above, there are not 195 observations (e.g. where an account was not closed). In the 
 
 
case of the four account types – accumulating, contingency, draw down and in and out – there is one account with just one 
deposit and therefore does not fit this classification. 
 
The transaction averages reveal clear differences between the three groups of savers based on 
opening deposit amount. Small savers continue to make comparatively small deposits and 
withdrawals once they open with their modest amount. They also make a considerably higher 
number of deposits over the life of their account and have a noticeably high ratio of deposits 
to withdrawals (approximately 3 deposits to every one withdrawal). In relative terms, they are 
the most successful savers in terms of total deposited held relative to their opening balance. 
Indeed, the behaviour most often observed in this group is of savers steadily building up their 
account with small deposits over time and then withdrawing a large amount(s) – presumably 
to cover planned or necessary one-off expenditure.  
In contrast, as a group, the £30 depositors make the least deposits and withdrawals over the 
life of their accounts. Those who open their accounts with the maximum permitted tend to 
make much larger value deposits and withdrawals over the life of their account, but they 
accumulate the least in relative terms. In max deposit accounts, we witness very short-term and 
relatively insignificant profit taking (withdrawing the £30 principal, and – at best – a single 
full year’s interest payment of 15s, but often less than that amount), or the desire to hold a 
relatively modest amount of surplus cash, available at short notice, on a recurring annual basis. 
The failure of £30 opening deposit accounts to accumulate further significant savings in time 
supports an interpretation of individuals seeking a secure storage option over a pure profit 
making/taking strategy.xli  
Table 3 shows the classification of account types using Perriton and Maltby’s classification 
system.xlii Their system is useful as it allocates accounts to one of four types based on the 
overall pattern of the account. The identifying criteria are as follows: (i) accumulating – the 
 
 
account has multiple deposits and then a lump sum withdrawal, (ii) contingency – the account 
has both deposits and withdrawals, (iii) draw down – the account has a single lump sum deposit 
that is depleted by multiple withdrawals, and (iv) in and out – the account has only one deposit 
and one withdrawal. One could argue that this classification system oversimplifies depositor 
behaviour. Indeed, depositor behaviour may even be dictated by different motivations at 
different times. However, as a general indicator of behaviour the classification system enables 
us to usefully combine accounts for comparison purpose. Table 3 shows that contingency 
accounts represent the largest proportion of accounts regardless of opening balance – over 40 
per cent in each opening band. For accumulating accounts, where deposits are built up before 
a lump sum is withdrawn, the incidence among small savers is particularly pronounced, 
suggesting they are aggregating their deposits in anticipation of a future need. By contrast, for 
draw down accounts small savers are completely lacking – which may reflect their small initial 
investment and related scope for depletion. At the other extreme, max depositors have a 
particularly high incidence of in and out accounts and lack representation in the accumulating 
category. This, again, suggests that such depositors are using the bank as a safe storage facility 
for their funds that has the benefit of interest added, rather than building up deposits over time.          
Figure 2 shows how the opening transaction amount relates to gender, age, and marital status 




Figure 2 shows that children have the highest proportion of small opening balance accounts, 
which we might expect given that they are not likely to be regular earners and are perhaps 
receiving deposit amounts as gifts. However, they are also over-represented, relative to their 
total account holdings, in the £30 opening deposit category. The latter gives some credence to 
the belief that some child accounts were used by adults to get round deposit ceilings and/or the 
restriction on holding multiple accounts.xliii Among adults, women open a higher proportion of 
small accounts than their male counterparts, with single women over-represented in this lower 
range. Single women lack significant representation in the maximum deposit category. The 
disaggregation of the adult women accounts shows the anomalous position of widows among 
the adult women sample, as widows alone are represented in increasing percentages as the 
opening balances increase. Joint and trust accounts tend not to have small opening balances; 
instead they are opened with amounts predominantly in the intermediate category.  
VI. Depositor location and behaviour 
To consider the impact of distance on savings behaviour, we allocate depositors to various 
groups according to how far their residential addresses are from the bank: within a half mile 



























Figure 2. Percentage of depositors in each opening balance category
£2 or less Between £2 and £30 £30 (or more)
 
 
outside the map area (6%).xliv This enables us to consider the impact of distance on behaviour. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics disaggregated by distance. 
 
Table 4. Depositor behaviour by distance 
 < 0.5 mile 0.5 to 1 mile > 1 mile Outside map 
Opened at max. balance 20.56% 27.08% 21.43% 9.09% 
Opening balance £12 7s 5d £14 1s 9d £13 19s 3d £7 0s 11d 
Average deposit £10 7s 8d £12 1s 5d £11 18s 10d £5 17s 3d 
Average withdrawal £13 9s 0d £16 16s 8d £16 8s 6d £20 4s 8d 
Total deposited £40 6s 5d £56 18s 3d £45 13s 1d £20 5s 10d 
Number of deposits 7.79 6.54 9.46 5.18 
Number of withdrawals 5.24 5.79 5.50 2.18 
Account duration 4.98 years 6.40 years 4.87 years 5.17 years 
Accumulating 
18.87% 10.42% 25.00% 54.55% 
Contingency 
47.17% 47.92% 46.43% 18.18% 
Draw down 
14.15% 10.42% 10.71% 9.09% 
In and out 
19.81% 31.25% 17.86% 18.18% 
Note: Non-percentage figures are means. One depositor’s location could not be identified. For some of the statistics above, 
there are not 194 observations (e.g. where an account was not closed). In the case of the four account types – accumulating, 




If we consider the first three columns, there is evidence that those living within half a mile of 
the bank have a smaller opening balance, make smaller deposits and withdrawals, and deposit 
less altogether than their counterparts. This may reflect a heightened propensity among small 
savers to engage in saving when a bank is more local. We see no obvious difference in the 
number of withdrawals, and for the remaining variables there is a lack of clear differentiation 
according to distance. Those outside our map area are somewhat anomalous, perhaps due to 
the small number of savers in this category.  
To better understand the impact of distance, we consider its association with various transaction 
indicators through regression analysis. We use an OLS model and report the results in Table 5. 
The column headers indicate the respective dependent variables.  








No. of dep. 
(5) 
Dep. to with. 
      
Adult female, 
widow 
0.145 0.042 -0.515 -3.523* -1.154* 
 (0.495) (0.456) (0.416) (1.997) (0.620) 
Adult female, 
married 
-0.472 -0.408 -0.382 0.253 -0.212 
 (0.385) (0.366) (0.329) (2.265) (0.575) 
Adult female, single -0.672** -0.723** -0.964*** -3.227** -0.156 
 (0.332) (0.299) (0.289) (1.433) (0.519) 
Child, male -1.054** -0.677 -0.827* 3.804 -0.300 
 (0.528) (0.467) (0.429) (5.998) (0.486) 
Child, female -0.910* -0.841* -0.918* -0.822 0.974 
 (0.493) (0.461) (0.547) (1.959) (0.789) 
Joint 0.682** 0.422 0.033 -2.611 -1.383*** 
 (0.275) (0.271) (0.231) (2.103) (0.509) 
Trust -0.093 -0.044 -0.567 -5.564** -0.248 
 (0.368) (0.379) (0.351) (2.173) (0.979) 
Within 0.5 mile 0.010 0.020 0.220 4.042** -1.128** 
 (0.265) (0.251) (0.224) (1.573) (0.569) 
0.5 to 1 mile away -0.087 -0.011 0.185 3.458** -0.988 
 (0.353) (0.332) (0.365) (1.358) (0.623) 
Duration 0.023 -0.029 0.530*** 4.264*** 0.321*** 
 (0.087) (0.079) (0.096) (1.026) (0.115) 
Max depositor    -3.726*** -1.068*** 
 
 
    (1.245) (0.298) 
Constant 7.439*** 7.671*** 5.107*** -23.118*** 1.246 
 (0.697) (0.628) (0.756) (7.302) (0.818) 
      
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 
R-squared 0.096 0.070 0.302 0.305 0.157 
Notes: OLS model. Open. bal. = Opening balance; Avg. dep. = Average deposit; Tot. dep. = Total deposited; No. of Dep. = 
Number of deposits; Dep. to with. = Ratio of deposits to withdrawals. The following are dummy variables: Adult female, 
widow; Adult female, married; Adult female, single; Child, male; Child, female; Joint; Trust; Within 0.5 mile; 0.5 to 1 mile 
away, Max depositor. Duration is the natural logarithm of account duration in days. Opening balance, average deposit and 
total deposited are the natural logarithm of the respective figures in pence. The number of deposits and the ratio of deposits 
to withdrawals are as their name suggests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
This analysis reveals that location is only statistically significant for two of the five transaction 
measures used, namely, the number of deposits and the ratio of deposits to withdrawals. We 
see that depositors who live within a half mile of the bank make a significantly higher number 
of deposits, which suggests that closer proximity increases transactional activity. Furthermore, 
those residing near the bank tend to have a significantly lower ratio of deposits to withdrawals, 
with the effect more obvious within a half mile radius.  
Among the other significant variables, children and single women tend to have lower opening, 
average and total deposits, which is consistent with their lower earnings potential. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, accounts which are open longer tend to deposit a larger value of deposits and 
have more deposits; they also have more deposits vis-à-vis withdrawals. We also see that max 
depositors tend to make significantly fewer deposits and have a lower deposit-to-withdrawal 
ratio – possibly reflecting the storage aspect mentioned previously. This pattern for max 
depositors is also evident for widows, because they are frequently max depositors. In addition, 
and consistent with the earlier summary statistics, joint accounts have a significantly lower 
deposit-to-withdrawal ratio – which likely relates to the relatively high number of withdrawals 
we see with such accounts that we attribute to smoothing of domestic expenditure in joint 
married accounts. Joint accounts also tend to have a relatively high opening balance.  
 
 
VII. Gaming the system 
Class of depositor analyses implicitly support the idea that evidence of middle-class depositors 
is evidence of, at best, an imposition on an institution set up to aid the poor to save and, at 
worst, deliberate misuse of the savings bank system.xlv Had there been alternative institutions 
offering safe, convenient, and low/no cost banking options for those with middling amounts of 
savings then these criticisms would hold greater weight. Although it had long been the practice 
of Scottish banks to offer interest on deposits, as late as 1826 the Bank of England, the Bank 
of Ireland, and the private London banks still did not. The English joint-stock banks formed 
after that period did offer interest in order to compete for deposits, but the operation of joint-
stock banks were restricted within a 65-mile radius of London until 1883.xlvi  
The offer of interest on deposits by Scottish public and provincial banks was arguably a 
response to a capital-scarce economy, and the need to incentivise cash deposits.xlvii Under the 
deposit receipt system, any sum over £10 could be placed with the bank, interest was paid 
annually, and when a withdrawal was made the existing receipt was voided and a new one 
added. By the 1840s, provincial banks were accepting deposits as low as £2. The deposit receipt 
was the main mechanism by which Scottish banks took deposits for a century and a half, and 
although they were also a feature of English country banks in the 19th century not all receipts 
attracted interest.xlviii In such a restrictive environment, the English saver had few other options 
than the savings banks if they wished to deposit small (relative to the expectations of joint-
stock banks) amounts at interest.  
Given the lack of options available to English middle-class savers of modest means, there is 
little to be gained by continuing to frame the presence of middle-class savers in English savings 
bank ledgers as problematic in and of itself. Instead, we have the data within the account 
ledgers to make better judgements about what behaviours were likely to represent an affront to 
 
 
the values of the system without being a substantial threat to its continuation. Problematic 
behaviours are, for obvious reasons, more likely to be found in the £30 opening deposit 
category and, in this section, we look in more detail at the accounts of these depositors.  
We are confident that the 1830 cohort did not contain any depositors operating in the most 
obvious profit-seeking manner i.e. by depositing the maximum amounts allowed in their 
accounts in the shortest period of time with the aim of harvesting the interest payments. There 
is no instance amongst our 1830 sample in which a depositor opens an account with £30 and 
continues to deposit £30 each year until the limit is met. Although, Amelia Ford, a married 
woman, might have done so if her banking had not been cut short by death. She deposits the 
£30 limit for four consecutive years, and when her husband inherits her bank account he draws 
down from the balance. Twelve accounts are opened with the £30 maximum, attract interest 
for at least one year or part thereof, and closed without another deposit. The surprise, in terms 
of this group of depositors, is the frequency with which we see £30 deposited, the same amount 
withdrawn after qualifying for the payment of interest (which is left in the account), and then 
another £30 deposited in the next period. This strategy of keeping the total amount invested at 
around £30 rather than building up a large balance from which to harvest a small (but 
increasing) annual bonus would appear to confirm Fishlow’s view that the 1828 deposit limits 
had done as intended, and removed the ability for interest payments to generate substantial 
profits for the depositor.xlix Interest rates could still generate an advantage from a middling size 
of deposit in an individual account, but this was not an obvious route to a profit or income.   
With the removal of the potential for a single account to generate an income stream via interest 
payments in 1828, official attention then turned to the saver who might open multiple accounts 
to achieve the same end. Instead of being able to deposit £300 in an account, an individual 
wishing to gain the interest due on that amount would have to open ten separate £30 accounts. 
 
 
A change to the regulations in 1828 therefore tried to close this potential loophole by limiting 
individuals to one savings bank account in total, not one account in a single bank. With each 
savings bank being independent, and no capacity (or technology) that allowed cross-checking 
between banks the legislators were reliant on the deterrent power of advertised penalties. Each 
depositor was required to sign a declaration on opening an account that they had no other 
savings bank account. If discovered to be in possession of multiple accounts, the depositor 
would forfeit the balances in both or multiple accounts. 
The system was – obviously – open to abuse, especially if you lived in a city or travelled 
frequently. The east end of London was sufficiently populous that a depositor opening a second 
account in a neighbouring district’s savings bank could be reasonably confident of not being 
caught. The east end supported three savings banks in 1830. At the north-west extreme, about 
a 1.8 mile walk from the location of the Limehouse Savings Bank, was the Whitechapel 
Savings Bank. Its advertised interest rate was £3.5.2. (per £100) rather than the percentage 
interest rate we are more familiar with. The other bank that east end depositors could bank with 
in 1830, that of Poplar – less than a mile from Limehouse. Poplar was a much smaller 
establishment. Both Limehouse and Poplar offered interest rates of £3.6.8, which removed any 
incentive to chase a higher interest rate a little way down the road. Furthermore, as a 
correspondent to the Morning Chronicle newspaper explained, why go to the bother of banking 
at a less convenient location when the simplest method of gaining advantage was simply to 
open an account in your own name and then hold more ‘in trust’ for fictitious individuals?l  
Some of the Limehouse sample year depositors chose to deposit at a bank that was not the 
closest to their residential address, yet do not appear to be trying to gain advantage. Amongst 
our 195 1830 depositors there are three account holders who provide addresses almost in the 
shadow of the Whitechapel Savings Bank, and eight in total within half a mile of that 
 
 
institution, suggesting that some found the longer walk to Limehouse worthwhile for their own 
personal reasons. Ruth Noble, who resides at an address close to the Whitechapel bank, appears 
to bank in Limehouse on a weekly basis for two other servants as their trustee. We cannot see 
that she profits in either case. One trust is dissolved and is taken over by the trustee, and the 
other account lapses.   
There are no obvious accounts that are based ‘out of area’ i.e. savers with addresses outside of 
the east end, that appear to be gaming the system. There is a single out of area account that 
opens with £30 (account no. 83), but it belongs to a married woman who gives her address as 
a naval ship, so she is probably banking the annual wages of her husband. Some of the out of 
area accounts are those of single women in service and we assume that they are banking close 
to their family home rather than their place of employment and residence. There is one account 
(no. 137) where £12 is banked per year for 4 years and then closed, but such regular deposits 
could easily be attributed to live-in employment elsewhere rather than indicating a second 
(prohibited) account.   
Trust accounts are, however, problematic in this period. The 19th century saw the rapid spread 
of trusts. Formerly a legal mechanism used by the aristocracy to protect their wealth and land 
holdings through the male line, trusts were adopted by the middle class as a way of protecting 
more modest sums. Trusts required no registration and were considered a private arrangement, 
but their increasing use eventually required legal reform.li Legislators moved more quickly in 
respect of trust accounts in savings banks than they did in regulating trusts elsewhere. The 1844 
Savings Bank Act, the draft of which proposed to disallow accounts held in trust for fear that 
they were being used to evade the prohibition against multiple account holding, eventually 
passed with the new regulation that the beneficiary must sign with the trustee for withdrawals.lii 
The percentage of trust accounts opened in Limehouse does drop noticeably in 1845. In 1843, 
 
 
35 trust accounts were opened and only six in 1846 but numbers recover later in the 1840s and 
trust accounts only start to disappear as a common account type in Limehouse in the second 
half of the 1850s.  
The trust accounts opened by our 1830 savers have a higher than average deposit-to-withdrawal 
ratio i.e. suggestive of an accumulation strategy. Only four of the ten trust accounts opened in 
Limehouse in 1830 were held by parents for children, but all four are operated in a way that is 
consistent with storing family money – not always in large amounts – as opposed to instructing 
a child in the habits of thrift. Solomon Richards – in addition to his own account – opens one 
in trust for his daughter, makes two deposits in one year that total the maximum annual deposit 
of £30, and withdraws it after interest is paid. Mark Pillar opens an account in trust for his 
daughter Harriet, deposits £3 and withdraws it four years later. Henry Stacey opens a trust 
account for his daughter Mary, aged 6, which runs alongside his own account until he dies in 
1854, when Mary would have been 30. The presumption is that Henry operates the trust account 
without Mary’s knowledge or benefit in order to supplement his own individual account.   
An alternative to a trust account, should an individual wish to circumvent the one account rule, 
was to open an account in the name of your child/children and operate the child accounts in 
tandem with your own. Ledger data gives us the ability to compare linked family accounts for 
mirrored transactions.liii Family accounts are largely dismissed in class of depositor analysis. 
Fishlow, for example, refers to savers without a listed occupation as ‘…otherwise unidentified 
women and children’. Parliamentary reports allocated wives to the husbands’ occupation and 
put all minors in a separate category.liv We establish family groups by recording linked 
accounts when we encounter them in the ledgers – these are typically savers with the same 
family name and residential address, and that we can see by the pattern of transactions are not 
 
 
operating their accounts independently. For example, we consider the accounts linked and 
potentially problematic if there are two child siblings who open accounts on the same day. 
Our 1830 data contained 16 family groups, of which four comprised related adults. The 
remaining twelve family groups (representing 22 accounts) were linked via child siblings in 
the same household, or where there was clearly an adult parent with an account alongside one 
or more accounts opened in a child’s name. Of those remaining twelve family groups, we 
identified two family groups where accounts were being operated independently and without 
suspicion of being puppet accounts. In the ten remaining family groups, the amounts deposited 
and withdrawn and the dates these transactions were made were identical, or very similar across 
the accounts within the family. We interpret this behaviour as adults using child accounts as 
cover for multiple account holding.   
In summary, out of the 195 accounts examined in the 1830 cohort we flagged 20 that had 
transaction records that were suggestive of accounts that were operating outside of the spirit 
(and letter) of the regulations.lv If we assume that the ostensible owners of the puppet accounts 
– the children of adult savers – are not aware of the existence of these accounts, then the number 
of suspected individuals gaming the system falls to six in total. Only two of these savers kept 
the suspect accounts open for longer than a year. The majority of the suspect accounts were in 
existence for very short periods of time, suggesting a need to keep surplus resource safe until 
it was needed or re-invested elsewhere. Of course, there may be more individuals gaming the 
system than we identified who are hiding in plain sight and whose transaction history is more 
subtle than that of the account holders we identify in Table 6. It is equally the case that some 
of the individuals we have identified are possibly suspected without cause. For example, it is 
possible that Mary Stacey has a disability that prevented her from banking, and that holding a 
trust account for her into adulthood is defensible. But our view is that a circa 10% rate in respect 
 
 
of suspect accounts should not be the basis of a moral panic or grounds for dismissing the 
undoubted benefits that the savings bank provided to its depositors.  





































Cont Suspected multiple account holding via trust. Solomon’s 
account is opened on 25 Jan, the trust account is opened 
on 15 Feb. Both accounts are emptied on 8 Nov. The trust 
account does not reopen. Solomon begins using account 





















1 1 0.17 I/O Suspected multiple account holding via wife and child. 
Mirrored activity. 
All accounts are opened on 1 Feb and closed on 5 Apr 











































2 1 0.61 Acc William, Amelia and Thomas all open their accounts on 1 
Feb. ‘Thomas’ makes an additional deposit in Feb (unlike 
the others). William and ‘Amelia’ close their accounts on 
19 Jul 1830. ‘Thomas’ closes his account on 13 Sep 1830.  
Henry and Harriet’s accounts are opened on 15 Feb. 
‘Harriet’ closes her account on 17 May 1830. ‘Henry’ 
makes a withdrawal on the same date and then one further 












































1 2 0.59 D/D Suspected multiple account holding via child.  
Both accounts are opened on 12 Apr. The joint account is 
emptied with two withdrawals and after this the other 



















1 1 0.57 I/O Suspected multiple account holding via children.  
All three accounts are opened on 3 May. On 7 Jun 1830, 
Sarah deposits a further £20 (on top of her opening £10). 





































4 11 - Cont Suspected multiple account holding via child. Majority 
mirrored activity. 
Both accounts are opened on 10 May. Robert Jnr has two 
withdrawals – the first, which harvests the annual interest, 
falls on the same date as a withdrawal from father’s 
account (7 Feb 1831). After Robert Jnr’s account is closed 
on 19 Sep 1831, father’s account has a withdrawal on 17 
Oct 1831 which empties it. On 14 May 1838, activity in 
father’s account recommences. Account appears to be 





















2 6 7.14 Cont Suspected multiple account holding via children. Majority 
mirrored activity. Also, living close to Whitechapel 
Savings Bank.  
All accounts are opened on 7 Jun. Sarah Jnr and Henry’s 
accounts are closed on 28 Feb 1831. Sarah Snr only 




















1 1 0.73 I/O 
Note: Names in bold are the assumed principal account holders. No. of dep. = Number of deposits; No. of with. = Number of 
withdrawals; Total dep. = Total deposited; Avg. dep. = Average deposit; Avg. with. = Average withdrawal; Dur. in years. = 




VIII. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have shown the value provided by transaction data in the study of British 
savings banks in the 19th century. Although the data collection from hand-written ledgers is 
time-consuming, and therefore not without cost, there are significant benefits in adopting such 
an approach. Transaction data allows us to – finally – move away from occupational class as a 
way of recording and comparing British savings bank depositors. Occupational class, and 
descriptions of savers who are not listed according to their employment – such as women and 
children, differ widely between institutions. They are an unsafe basis for comparisons of savers 
across institutions, or across time periods, or nations. Using transactions to characterise saver 
behaviour will enable more intranational and international comparative work, especially if 
researchers can use a common framework of account categories and observation types e.g. 
opening deposits.  
In respect of our working hypotheses for the 1830 cohort research, we find that opening deposit 
data is indicative of future savings behaviour. The data suggests that where the opening deposit 
is small it is more likely to lead to a savings approach to the account. In contrast, where the 
opening deposit is at the annual deposit limit of £30 the account is more likely to be used for 
parking or storing money. Opening deposit may also indicate broad differences in motivation 
to have an account, with those opened at £30 arguably more strategic in their aims, particularly 
in the case of child accounts.   
Our analysis of the 1830 cohort also reinforces the finding of contemporary microfinance and 
savings theory that proximity to banks matters. Savers in close proximity to the bank in our 
sample tend to make smaller transactions. This may reflect the greater uptake of savings 
services among less affluent clientele when a bank is closer to them. There is also some 
 
 
evidence that those living closest to the bank make more deposits, which again reflects 
locational convenience.  
Finally, we examined the transactions in order to identify accounts that were potentially gaming 
the savings bank system. The presence of comparatively high numbers of middle-class savers, 
compared to those using savings banks in Ireland and Scotland, has – since the creation of the 
banks in the early 19th century – fuelled the suspicion that a large number of depositors were 
exploiting the generous interest rates offered. Occupational class analyses of savings banks 
have continued this narrative despite the lack of alternative low-cost or interest-bearing deposit 
opportunities for those with small to middling amounts of money to save. The suspicion 
remained in the literature that English savings banks were prey to organised middle-class 
rentier behaviour. Our cohort transaction analysis has revealed a low level of system gaming – 
affecting approximately 10% of the accounts opened in 1830. The most common strategy 
appeared to be opening an account(s) on behalf of your own children and using that account 
for short-term storage of money. There did not appear to be widespread rent-seeking behaviour 
in regard to interest payments. Most of the accounts that show evidence of being operated by 
parents as puppet accounts are open for very short periods of time – typically 6 months – and 
do not generate interest payments of the size that make them viable sources of additional 
income.  
Indeed, when we look at the transactions of the 1830 cohort overall, they tell a familiar and 
oddly comforting and human collective tale of short-term accumulations, long gaps between 
deposits, and a distinct lack of success in the long term. An analysis of the cohort transactions 
shows us the limitations of the contemporaneous debates about access to financial institutions. 
Neither the view that savings banks would lift the working class out of poverty through habits 
of thrift, nor the belief that savings banks were routinely exploited by the middle classes, is 
 
 
supported by the data.  Rather, the savers at the Limehouse Savings Bank appear to be adapting 
its financial services to suit their individual needs. These behaviours were not those espoused 
by legislators, but nonetheless were valid in the absence of readily available alternatives. 
Examining transaction data enables us to better position English and Welsh savings banks 
within the history of retail banking and humanise the longitudinal behaviours of their diverse 
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